Brian Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Company, the Bicycle Center, and John Does I through V : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Brian Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Company, the
Bicycle Center, and John Does I through V : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Darwin Hansen; Morgan & Hansen; Gary Ferguson; Williams & Hunt.
Edward T. Wells; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Company, No. 920708 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3694
U :AH C0U37 OF APPEALS 
BPJEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
£0 
DOCKET NO.. 
K7 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIAN BURNS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNONDALE BICYCLE COMPANY, 
THE BICYCLE CENTER, and JOHN 
DOES I THROUGH V, 
Defendants/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/ 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
Case No. 920708-CA 
Dist. Court No. 900901567 
Category 15 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Gary B. Ferguson No. 1062 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
MAR 3 0 1993 
J- Mary T. Noonan 
f Clerk of the Court 
Edward T. Wells No. 3422 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Darwin C. Hansen, No. 2058 
Randall D. Lund, No. 5617 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, 8th Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIAN BURNS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNONDALE BICYCLE COMPANY, 
THE BICYCLE CENTER, and JOHN 
DOES I THROUGH V, 
Defendants/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/ 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
Case No. 920708-CA 
Dist. Court No. 900901567 
Category 15 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON 
Gary B. Ferguson No. 1062 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Edward T. Wells No. 3422 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Darwin C. Hansen, No. 2058 
Randall D. Lund, No. 5617 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns- Building, 8th Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 4 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
POINT I 12 
POINT II 22 
POINT III 23 
POINT IV 24 
POINT V 24 
POINT VI 30 
POINT VII 38 
POINT VIII 40 
CONCLUSION 43 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Blacknell v. State. 502 N.E. 2d 899 42 
Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) . . . . 12 
Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet - Buick. 579 So.2d 1328 
(Ala. 1991) 20 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317 (1986) 13 
Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc.. 775 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah App. 1989) 12, 19 
Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039 
(Utah 1983) 19 
Gold Standard v. American Resources. 805 P.2d 164 
(Utah 1990) 39 
Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d (Utah 1979) . . . 14, 22 
Horoan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982) . 14 
Horslev v. Robinson. 186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947) 24 
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank. 93 F.R.D. 471, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) 34 
Marchant v. Park Citv. 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989) . . . . 31 
Massev v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980) . 19 
Mav v. Moore. 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982) 29 
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage. 
115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 27 
Nation-wide Check Corp. Inc. v. Forrest Hills 
Distributors. Inc.. 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982) 28 
Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 14 
Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines. Inc.. 54 F.R.D. 21, 22-23 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) 34 
Turick bv Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp.. USA. 121 F.R.D. 32 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) 32 
United States v. IBM. 67 F.R.D. 40, 42, n.l (1975) . . . 32, 33 
Williams v. Oaden Union Ry. & Depot Co.. 230 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1951) 24 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 
529 F. Supp. 866, 890 (E.D. Pa.) (1981) 34, 35 
779 P.2d 688 31 
788 P.2d 520 (1990) 31 
Statute and Rules 
Am. Jur. 2d. Evidence §177 at 220-21 30 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(C) 33, 34 
JIFU 16.6 24 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-35(1) (1990) 41 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-35(1) (a) (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-36(9) (1990) 3, 42 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-52 (1990) 41 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-52 (1) (a) (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-53(15) (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (1977, as Amended) 15 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c) 31 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(C)(7) 2, 31, 38 
Am. Jur. 2d. Evidence §177 at 220-21 22, 25 
JIFU 16.6 17, 19 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6, 7 
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (1992) 8, 10 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIAN BURNS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNONDALE BICYCLE COMPANY, 
THE BICYCLE CENTER, and JOHN 
DOES I THROUGH V, 
Defendants/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/ 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
Case NO. 920708-CA 
Dist. Court No. 900901567 
Category 15 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a 
Motion for Summary Judgment for The Bicycle Center ("BC") from the 
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (1992). 
STATEMENT OF I8SUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Plaintiff has stated the issues regarding his appeal in 
his opening brief. BC sets forth the following issues regarding its 
cross-appeal: 
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting 
Plaintiff's motion for a protective order with respect to 
Plaintiff's business records absent a showing of "good cause"? 
2. Is there an ethical obligation and/or duty on the court 
and attorneys, as officers of the court, to disclose to the 
appropriate agencies, information found in documents produced 
during discovery which provide a prima facie case of violations of 
the laws of the State of Utah? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULE8 AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules and statutes are applicable to issues on 
cross-appeal. 
1. Utah R. Civ, P. 26(c)(7) - Protective Orders: 
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the 
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause 
shown [emphasis added], the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a 
deposition, the court in the district where the 
deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense, including one or more of the following: 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be disclosed 
or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole 
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions 
as are just, order that any party or person provide or 
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) 
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to 
the motion. 
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2. Utah Code Ann, 58-12-53(15) (1990), Unprofessional Conduct: 
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized 
standards of ethics of the chiropractic profession, or 
any conduct or practice which does or might constitute a 
danger to the health, welfare or safety of the patient or 
public, or any conduct, practice or condition which does 
or might impair the ability to practice chiropractic 
safely and skillfully. 
3. Utah Code Ann, 58-12-52(1)(a) (1990); 
(1) The director of the division, upon the written 
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or 
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in 
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in the 
following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral 
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct; 
4. Utah Code Ann, 58-12-35(1)(a) (1990): 
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of the 
board, shall deny an application for a license to 
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician 
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State 
in the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good 
moral character or has been guilty of 
unprofessional conduct as defined in this Act: 
5. Utah Code Ann, 58-12-36(9) (1990): 
"unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of 
medicine includes: 
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine by one 
not licensed or by one whose license is suspended; or 
practicing as a partner-agent, or employee of , or in 
joint venture with, any person who does not hold a 
license to practice medicine within this State; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action wherein the Plaintiff, Dr. 
Brian Burns, alleges that he sustained injury to his left wrist, 
neck, lower back, and head as a result of a bicycle accident that 
occurred on August 16, 1986. Plaintiff asserts that the Cannondale 
bicycle manufactured by Defendant Cannondale Bicycle Company 
("CBC") that he was riding was defective, causing him to go over 
the handlebars while he was traveling at approximately twenty-five 
miles an hour on the bicycle. The bicycle was sold to him by BC. 
Both defendants deny that the bicycle was, in any way, defective. 
Both defendants assert that the accident occurred as a result of 
Dr. Burn's conduct. (R. 395). 
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE 
BC is in agreement with the Plaintiff's statement of facts 
with the exceptions and additions set-forth below: 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
1. BC repaired and discarded the defective parts which had 
caused the malfunction. (Plaintiff's Brief, Page 6 f 6), 
Response; This statement is nothing more than unsubstantiated 
speculation. Not only has Plaintiff failed to show any causal 
relationship between the allegedly "defective parts" and his 
accident, but the Plaintiff has also failed to introduce any 
admissible evidence which would demonstrate: (1) that there were 
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"defective parts" on the bicycle in question; or (2) that said 
parts were "discarded" by BC. 
2. Mr. Blomquist admitted that a defect in the bicycle had 
caused the accident. Plaintiff's Brief Page 8, Para. 12f Fn. 1. 
Response; The Plaintiff incorrectly states that Mr. Blomquist 
"admitted that a defect in the bicycle had caused the accident." 
Conversely, it can only be said that Plaintiff claims that Mr. 
Blomquist admitted to him during a conversation at BCfs store that 
a "malfunction" in the bicycle had caused the accident. (R. 533). 
More importantly, BC's owner, Mr. Blomquist, testified in his 
deposition that "[t]here were no problems" with the bike when he 
examined it after the alleged accident. (R. 512-513 & 572). 
Consequently, aside from Plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Blomquist 
admitted to him that there was a "malfunction" in the bike, there 
is no evidence in the record indicating: (1) that there was a 
specific defect in the bicycle or one of its components at the time 
it was manufactured by Cannondale Bicycle Company ("CBC"); (2) that 
there was a defect in the bicycle or one of its components at the 
time is was assembled by BC; or (3) that the accident was 
proximately caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect in the bike 
or one of the components on the bike. 
5 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Although the accident complained of occurred on August 
16, 1986, Plaintiff did not commence this action until August 16, 
1989 (i.e, three years after the accident). (R. 005). 
2. From the date the Complaint was filed, both parties 
participated in discovery through June 19, 1992, the date discovery 
ceased by order of the trial court dated January 15, 1992. (R. 453-
454) . 
3. In bringing this action, the Plaintiff alleged that the 
subject accident was caused by a defective and dangerous condition 
in the front brake of his bicycle, to wit: 
[T]he brake spring for the front brakes of the bicycle popped 
off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front tire of the 
bicycle. (R. 003) . 
4. In exploring the impact such a defect would have on the 
bicycle, the expert consulted by the Plaintiff and his friend, Todd 
Bradford, informed the Plaintiff and Mr. Bradford that the loss of 
the front brake spring, as alleged by the Plaintiff in his 
complaint, would have the opposite effect alleged, to wit: the loss 
of the spring would cause the brakes to separate away from the rim 
such that even if the spring had "popped off,11 it would not be a 
probable cause of the accident. (R. 500). 
5. By way of an affidavit prepared and signed by Plaintiff's 
attorney Edward T. Wells of Robert J. Debry and Assoc, and filed 
with the trial court and served on defense counsel moments prior to 
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the hearing on CBC's and BC's motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiff's counsel ignored the fact that Plaintiff's own expert 
witness informed him that the brake was not a "probable cause" of 
the accident. Instead, Mr. Wells testified in his affidavit that: 
Plaintiff is unable to file affidavits in opposition to 
the pending summary judgment issues from expert witnesses 
because the defective part which allegedly caused plaintiff's 
injury is unavailable for inspection by an expert witness. 
Plaintiff claims the defective part or parts were 
discarded by defendant, The Bicycle Center, while acting as 
agent for warranty repairs for defendant Cannondale Bicycle 
Company. 
Plaintiff has produced testimony to support the 
spoliation claim, but due to the spoliation of evidence cannot 
produce evidence of the actual defect. 
(R. 590-591)(emphasis added). 
6. In the Plaintiff's deposition, he asserted that he 
sustained loss of income as a result of the bicycle accident in 
excess of $250,000. The defendants requested that the plaintiff 
produce his business records, and those of Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic, Inc., in order to determine the accuracy of this claim. 
The records were formally requested from Dr. Burns through a 
Request for Production of Documents. 
7. The records of Burns Chiropractic Clinic were obtained 
using a Subpoena Duces Tecum. Five pages were produced on October 
7, 1991, by Dr. Burns' accountants, Sorensen, Chido & May, pursuant 
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon them on September 23, 1991. 
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For the most part, the records that were the subject of the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order are financial records that 
were produced on August 9, 1991, and September 12
 f 1991. The 
documents produced on August 9, 1991, were produced pursuant to a 
Request for Production of Documents sent to Dr. Burns. The 
documents produced on September 12, 1991, were produced pursuant to 
the Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Records of Deposition served 
on the Burns Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. (R.397). 
8. The only stipulation reached regarding the protection of 
information obtained through discovery is found in pages 124 and 
125 of Dr. Burns' deposition. (R. 413-14). In that stipulation, 
counsel for the respective parties agreed that Dr. Burns' concept 
of "working smarter," as outlined in the deposition, would be 
included in a sealed portion of the deposition which would be kept 
confidential and used only in this litigation only. Specifically, 
the parties stipulated: 
Mr. Hansen: Let's go back on the record then and let me 
restate what I understand the agreement is. With respect to 
the deposition from this point forward, it is agreed by all 
counsel and the deponent that the deposition from this point 
forward will be sealed with the exception of the employees of 
State Farm, employees of Aetna Insurance, employees of the law 
firm of Morgan & Hansen, employees of the law firm of 
[Williams & Hunt]. (R. 421). 
9. As set-forth above, the terms o£ the stipulation entered 
into by counsel during Plaintiff's deposition relate only to the 
sealed portion of the deposition. No agreement or stipulation was 
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entered into with respect to the business records of Plaintiff or 
his business, Burns Chiropractic, Inc., which were produced 
pursuant to subsequent discovery requests by the defendants. 
10. At no time prior to October 29, 1991, did the Plaintiff 
seek a protective order from the court regarding the financial 
records Plaintiff is seeking to keep confidential. In fact, the 
documents that Plaintiff seeks to keep confidential were produced 
six to eight weeks prior to filing a Motion for Protective Order. 
(R. 398). 
11. The documents that the Plaintiff hopes to protect 
establish a prima facie case of violation by Dr. Burns and Dr. 
Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon, licensed to practice medicine 
in the State of Utah, of their respective professional licensing 
standards. The records further establish a prima facie case of 
perjury on the part of Dr. Burns when compared with his deposition 
testimony. (R. 413-14). 
12. Dr. Burns testified that he had no fee-sharing 
arrangement with Dr. Morrow. The documents show otherwise. 
(R. 414) . 
13. Dr. Morrow is an orthopedic surgeon who has his 
professional office in the same building as one of Dr. Burns1 
chiropractic clinics and is, in fact, a treating physician for Dr. 
Burns' in this case. (R. 398). 
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14. After the documents were produced on September 12, 1991, 
Plaintiff's counsel requested that defense counsel not disclose 
those documents to anyone other than staff in defense counsel's 
office working on the case, and clients. Defense counsel agreed to 
do so in order to allow Plaintiff's counsel time to file a Motion 
for Protective Order. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, BC disputes Plaintiff's 
specific statements concerning the relevant facts of this case as 
indicated above and further asserts that the additional facts 
numbered, 1 through 14 above, are essential to a proper 
understanding of the issues advanced in Plaintiff's Brief and for 
consideration of BC's cross-appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fact that BC's owner, Philip Blomquist, allegedly admitted 
that a "malfunction" in the bike caused the accident does not 
preclude summary judgement because even if it is assumed, arguendo, 
that such an admission was made, it does not provide the Plaintiff 
with evidence whereby he can meet his burden of proof on the 
specific elements of his products liability cause of action. 
Consequently, the trial court properly deemed the alleged 
admission to be "immaterial" in granting summary judgement in favor 
of BC. 
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Because the elements of a product liability claim are 
essentially identical to that of a breach of implied warranty 
claim, the Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate a genuine issue 
of material fact with respect to his breach of implied warranty 
claim and the summary judgement in favor of BC was proper. 
The mere fact an accident has occurred does not, in and of 
itself, support an inference that a defendant was negligent. 
Consequently, because there is no evidence that the subject 
bicycle, or any component thereon, was defective at the time of the 
accident or that a defect was the proximate cause of the action, 
there is no evidence to support Plaintifffs breach of express 
warranty claim and negligent assembly claim. 
Plaintiff's claim of evidence spoliation is without merit 
because: (1) there is no evidence BC knew of Plaintiff's claim and, 
pursuant thereto, intentionally discarded evidence; (2) there is no 
legal presumption of a defect when a repair person replaces a part 
on a piece of equipment; (3) a repair person does not have a duty 
to retain parts of equipment that are replaced when a product is 
serviced; and (4) even if it is assumed, arguendo, that evidence 
was discarded, there is no evidence in the record supporting 
Plaintiff's products liability claim or his claim that the part 
purportedly discarded was material to the establishment of 
Plaintiff's product liability claim. 
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The trial court erred in protecting the documents of the Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic, Inc., because the Plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate that there was "good cause" for the protective order. 
Additionally, there is no support for the Plaintiff's conclusion 
that the parties had stipulated to protect the documents during the 
Plaintiff's deposition. During the deposition, the parties agreed 
to seal a portion of the deposition. The parties did not agree that 
all documents regarding the Plaintiff's business would not be 
discoverable. 
The Plaintiff waived his right to a protective order regarding 
the documents involved because he produced the documents prior to 
seeking the protective order. Rule 26(c), which the Plaintiff 
relied upon before the trial court, contemplates that a protective 
order will be sought before the documents are produced. 
The documents sought to be protected reveal that Dr. Burns and 
Dr. Morrow had a fee sharing arrangement. Such an arrangement 
violates Utah professional licensing standards and could subject 
both Dr. Burns and Dr. Morrow to discipline by the Utah Department 
of Professional Licensing. The ethical standards accepted by both 
attorneys and judges require that they report any unprofessional 
conduct to the appropriate authorities. Moreover, these documents 
call into question Dr. Burn's credibility since Dr. Burns testified 
in his deposition that no such fee sharing arrangement existed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALTHOUGH FACTS AND INFERENCES BEFORE THE COURT 
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY OPPOSING SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT, THE MERE EXISTENCE OF ISSUES OF FACT DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT: ISSUES OF FACT MUST BE MATERIAL TO THE 
APPLICABLE RULE OF LAW 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a 
motion for summary judgment be granted only when there is "no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 
656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness. Dvbowski v. Ernest W. 
Hahn. Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Plaintiff contends that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists in this case because, on the one hand, BC and CBC presented 
experts who testified that defective front brakes on the bicycle 
could not have caused the accident while, on the other hand, the 
owner of BC allegedly admitted that a "malfunction" in the bike 
caused the accident. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 15) 
However, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that BCs owner 
admitted that a "malfunction" in the bike caused the alleged 
accident, such an admission does nothing to advance the Plaintiff's 
personal injury action because such an admission does not provide 
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the Plaintiff with any evidence whereby he can meet his burden of 
proof as to any specific element of his products liability claim. 
A. The Mere Existence of Issues of Fact Does Not Preclude gummary 
Judgment: The Issues Must Be Material To The Cause of Action. 
It has long been recognized by both federal and state courts 
that the mere existence of issues of fact does not preclude summary 
judgment if those issues do not pertain to an element essential to 
the opposing party's case. This important principle is most 
eloquently set-forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), wherein the Court 
stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates that 
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery 
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 
"no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-
moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial. 
Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). 
In interpreting Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which follows the federal version of Rule 56(c) 
verbatim, the Utah Supreme Court held in Horgan v. Industrial 
Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982), that: 
[T]he mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as 
a whole does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if 
those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case. 
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Id. at 752 (emphasis added). 
Elaborating on the standard set-forth in Horgan, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1983), that: 
Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly 
before the court are to be construed in favor of the opponent 
on a motion for summary judgment, the mere existence of issues 
of fact does not preclude summary judgment. The issues of 
fact must be material to the applicable rule of law. 
Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
B. Evidence Of A Malfunction Is Immaterial In Context of a 
Products Liability Action Because The Plaintiff Must Prove, By 
A Preponderance Of The Evidence, That A Dangerous And 
Defective Condition Existed When The Plaintiff Purchased The 
Product. 
In order to state a Prima Facie case for products liability 
against BC, the Plaintiff must show that his injuries were "caused" 
by a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in the 
Cannondale SR-600 (the "Bike") or, more specifically, the Diacomp 
400 front brake (the "Brake") on the Bike. Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was specifically adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 
(Utah 1979), states, in pertinent part: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . . 
Similarly, the Utah Product Liability Act requires the 
plaintiff prove that a "defect or defective condition in the 
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product" existed at the time it was "sold by the manufacturer or 
initial seller." Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (1992). 
Pursuant thereto, the Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that 
the Bike was defective because "the brake spring for the front 
brake popped off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front 
tire of the bicycle" which in turn "caused the bicycle to stop 
immediately". (R. 003). However, after three years of discovery, 
the record is devoid of any evidence substantiating Plaintiff's 
allegations. 
For example, despite alleging that the brake spring "popped 
off," the Plaintiff admitted in his answers to interrogatories that 
he did not see this happen, but instead stated that "I feel that 
there was a defect in the front brakes due to the fact that I went 
over the handle bars so abruptly. (R. 156)." 
Of those persons who inspected the bicycle following the 
accident, (i.e. Plaintiff's friend and associate, Todd Bradford, 
and Philip Blomquist, the owner of BC) , neither indicated that the 
front brake spring had popped off, was missing, or was otherwise 
broken. Conversely, Mr. Bradford stated that he could not identify 
a specific defect in the bike because "I'm not a bike professional, 
or expert . . .M1 and Mr. Blomquist testified that the Brake spring 
R. 542. 
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had not "popped off" because it was on the Bike when he examined it 
after the accident. Specifically, Mr. Blomquist testified: 
Q. Do you recall any conversation where you mentioned 
to him that you felt the spring had not worked properly 
or had broken and that was the cause of the calipers 
crimping down on the tire or wheel? 
A. I remember conversations to that nature, but I don't 
recall the spring being — I know the soring wasn't broken. 
In fact, there is no way it was broken, because I wouldn't 
have had a spring to replace it with. 
Q. So, that the brake assembly was never changed on the 
bike? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, that brake assembly, as we are sitting there looking 
at the bike, was the same one that was on the bicycle at the 
time of the accident? 
A. Correct. 
(R. 499 & 512-513)(emphasis added). 
Although Plaintiff admitted, by way of his attorney's 
affidavit, that he "cannot produce evidence of the actual defect" 
(R. 591), he tried to overcome this defect and avoid summary 
judgement by arguing that a genuine issue of material fact existed 
because BC's owner, Philip Blomquist, allegedly admitted to the 
Plaintiff that there was a "malfunction" in the bike.2 However, 
2
 In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Blomquist 
indicated to him that "[t]here was a malfunction, in essence, of 
the front braking system that caused the accident. (R. 533) . 
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even if it is assumed, arguendo. that Mr. Blomquist admitted that 
a "malfunction" caused the accident, such an admission is 
immaterial in the context of BC's summary judgement motion because 
a malfunction is not the equivalent of a "defective and 
unreasonably dangerous" condition. A "malfunction" occurs when 
something "functions badly or imperfectly." The definition of 
"defective" is "falling below the accepted standard in regularity 
and soundness of form or structure." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary (1976). 
Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that BC's 
alleged admission of a malfunction was "immaterial" and, pursuant 
thereto, granted BCfs summary judgement motion because the 
Plaintiff had a duty to respond to BCfs motion with a Prima Facie 
case that the product was "defective and unreasonably dangerous," 
not that it merely malfunctioned. (R. 679, Para. 5; R. 681, Para. 
5). 
C. Experts For Both Parties Agree That The Alleged Defect In The 
Front Brake Is Not A Probable Cause Of The Alleged Accident. 
Only two conclusions can be drawn from the evidence in the 
record regarding the implications of the broken or lost brake 
spring referred to by Plaintiff in his Complaint (R. 003): (1) the 
loss of the spring would not cause the bike to come to an immediate 
stop; and (2) assuming, arguendo, that the brake spring "popped" 
off as alleged by Plaintiff, the loss of the spring would not cause 
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the front brake to close on the rim, but instead, would probably 
result in the brake pads pulling away from the rim. 
BCfs expert, Stephen Henich, testified, by way of affidavit, 
that "if the front brake spring were to malfunction, it would not 
cause the front tire to instantaneously stop." (R. 506, Para. 
8(b)). 
CBC's expert, Ronald Jay Fisher, testified, by way of 
affidavit, that ff[t]he single brake pad up against the rim 
described by Brian Burns in his deposition would not cause the 
wheel to stop, thereby throwing the rider head over heels, off of 
the bicycle." (R. 484, Para. 7(b)(1)). 
Plaintiff's expert went a step further than either CBC or BC's 
experts and told Plaintiff and his friend, Todd Bradford, that if 
the spring actually "popped off" as the Plaintiff alleged in his 
Complaint, the brake would probably do the exact opposite of what 
Plaintiff alleged, to wit: the brake pads would separate away from 
the rim and such an occurrence, in his opinion, was not a "probable 
cause" of the accident: Specifically, Mr. Bradford testified: 
Q. What did he say, a spring malfunctioning, or what was his 
explanation as to how a spring malfunctioning might cause the 
brake to lock up the front wheel without the brake being 
activated? 
A. Well, he didn't think that would be the cause. 
Q. Pardon? 
A. He didn't think that was the cause. 
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Q. Oh. 
A. He said if a spring broke, probably released the other 
wav. the brakes would not go in, they'd ao out. 
Q. So he discounted a spring malfunctioning as being the 
cause of the accident? 
A. In his opinion, he said that he didn't think that was a 
probable cause. 
(R. 499-500)(emphasis added). 
In Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co. . 537 P.2d 1039 
(Utah 1983) , the Utah Supreme Court held that a party may not rely 
upon allegations in the pleading to counter affidavits made upon 
personal knowledge stating facts contrary to those alleged in the 
pleadings. Furthermore, even though summary judgment is reserved 
for only the most clear cut negligence cases, as pointed out by 
Plaintiff, this Court has previously stated that if there is no 
factual support for the allegations, summary judgment should be 
affirmed. Specifically, in Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc., 775 
P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989), this Court said: 
Although it is true that summary judgment is reserved for only 
the most clear-cut negligence cases, bare contentions, 
unsupported bv any specification of facts in support thereof, 
raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of 
summary judgment. 
Id. at 446 (quoting Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1980)(emphasis added)). 
In this instance, there is no physical evidence, no testimony 
based on personal knowledge and no expert testimony which supports 
20 
Plaintiff's allegation that the front brake spring "popped off" or 
caused the front tire to lock and cause the bike to come to an 
instantaneous stop. Instead, there are only unsupported 
allegations and Plaintiff's "feel final" that something was wrong 
with the front brake. (R. 156). 
The case at hand is much like the case of Brooks v. Colonial 
Chevrolet - Buick. 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala. 1991). In Brooks, a husband 
and wife brought a products liability action against the 
manufacturer, General Motors, and a negligent repair cause of 
action against the dealer, Colonial Chevrolet - Buick. With regard 
to the products liability cause of action, the plaintiffs claimed 
a defect in the braking system of the vehicle caused or contributed 
to two accidents in which they were involved. As in Utah, in order 
to establish a prima facie case of products liability in Alabama, 
plaintiffs must prove that their "injuries and damages proximately 
resulted from the product's failure of performance causally related 
to its defective condition." Id. at 1332. 
In opposition to General Motors motion for summary judgment, 
the plaintiffs in Brooks, like the Plaintiff in the instant matter, 
did not produce any expert testimony that the subject accidents 
were caused by a defective condition with the brakes. Rather, they 
relied on circumstantial evidence and a statement attributed to 
Colonial's service manager by the Plaintiffs that "there's 
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something wrong with the car, but we don't know how to fix it." 
Id. at 1330. However, despite this alleged admission by the 
defendants' service manager, the trial court granted defendants' 
motions for summary judgment and held: 
This court finds as a result of all the information provided 
that the technical and mechanical issues involved in [the 
Brookses'] allegations are of such a nature that [the 
Brookses'] cannot make out a prima facie case and meet their 
burden of proof without the submittal of expert testimony with 
respect to the claims against both [GM and Colonial.] 
Id. at 1329-30, (modifications in original). 
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court sustained the trial 
court's ruling and specifically concluded: 
[T]he manufacturer of a product is not an insurer against all 
kinds of harm that might be caused by the use of a product, 
and the manufacturer or designer is not obligated to produce 
an accident-proof or injury-proof product. 
* * * 
TT]he failure of a product does not presuppose the existence 
of a defect. The fact that someone was injured while using a 
product does not establish that the product was unreasonably 
dangerous when put to its intended use. 
* * * 
The only evidence the Brookses presented concerning a defect 
in design was their own testimony as to the alleged 
defectiveness of the brakes and as to the alleged injuries 
thev suffered as a result. Such evidence as to the cause of 
a product failure amounts to mere speculation and conclusorv 
statements; without more, it is insufficient to prove a prima 
facie case . . . 
Id. at 1330 - 33 (emphasis added). 
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The case at hand presents an even more compelling case for 
summary judgment than Brooks because the Plaintiff in the instant 
matter has failed to produce: (1) any evidence in the form of 
personal knowledge supporting his allegation that the Brake spring 
"popped off"; (2) any expert testimony which would indicate that 
the front tire would lock-up if the Brake spring "popped off;" or 
(3) that his accident was otherwise caused by a defect in the front 
brake of the Bike. Conversely, the fact of the matter is that the 
Plaintiff consulted with an expert and that expert informed him 
that the Brake was not the "probable cause" of the accident (R. 
499-500). 
Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's attorney's testimony in his 
affidavit offered in opposition to BC's motion for summary 
judgement wherein he stated that he could not obtain affidavits 
from experts opposing BC and CBC's motions for summary judgment,3 
the fact of the matter is Mr. Wells chose not to use his expert's 
testimony because it contradicted Plaintiff's theory of liability. 
Plaintiff's case is based on nothing more than unsubstantiated 
speculation and, quoting the Plaintiff himself, something he 
"feel[s]". (R. 156). In accordance with the authorities cited 
above, summary judgment in favor of BC should be affirmed. 
See R. 590 - 591. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY CAUSE OF ACTION 
SHOULD FAIL FOR THE SAME REASON AS HIS 
PRODUCT8 LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION 
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 152 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that: 
The elements of both actions [i.e. products liability and 
breach of implied warranty] are essentially the same and 
analysis for purpose of determining defenses to breach 
of implied warranty parallels that for strict products 
liability. Therefore, the same defenses discussed under 
strict products liability are available under breach of 
implied warranty. 
Id. at 159. (emphasis added). 
In light of Hahn, Plaintiff's cause of action for breac 
implied warranty should fail for the same reasons that his prod 
liability cause of action fails. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION BREACH OF EXPRESS 
WARRANTY SHOULD FAIL BBCAU8E THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE OF A DEFECTIVE FRONT BRAKE 
Presumably, the basis for Plaintiff's breach of exp 
warranty cause of action against BC are oral representations 
regarding the quality of the Bike made by Phil Blomquist, the oi 
of BC. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he and Mr. Blomqp 
discussed the following matters during the sales process: 
Q. What if anything did he tell you about this bike? 
A. Well, I remember kind of how he sold me on it was 
that the frame was unique to other bikes as far as 
the strength in it and the crank that it had, that 
would not flex, also that the frame and the crank 
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itself would give me the most direct power to the 
rear wheel, and the brakes were the latest thing 
out, and then the weight, it was light even though 
it had this super strong frame. 
(R. 502). 
However, the record is devoid of evidence that the Bike's 
frame, crank, or brakes were defective, improperly assembled, 
malfunctioned or operated inconsistently with any of Phil 
Blomquist's representations. Consequently, Plaintiff's breach of 
express warranty was properly dismissed. 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SUBJECT 
ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE BICYCLE. 
HIS NEGLIGENT ASSEMBLY CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
It is well recognized that the mere fact an accident occurred, 
considered alone, does not support an inference that a defendant 
was negligent. See Williams v. Oaden Union Rv. & Depot Co.. 230 
P.2d 315 (Utah 1951); Horslev v. Robinson. 186 P.2d 592 (Utah 
1947); JIFU 16.6. As there is no evidence that the subject bicycle 
was defective at the time of the accident or that a defect was the 
proximate cause of the accident, Plaintiff's negligent assembly 
cause of action was properly dismissed by the trial court. 
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POINT V 
PLAINTIFF'S SPOLIATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD INDICATING THAT THE ALLEGED 
DEFECT IN THE BRAKE COULD HAVE CAUSED THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT 
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BC INTENTIONALLY DISCARDED THE 
EVIDENCE 
An examination of Plaintiff's spoliation argument reveals that 
his argument is without merit. 
First, Plaintiff incorrectly asserts in his brief that: 
As a general rule, the destruction of or spoliation of 
relevant evidence raises and inference that the evidence would 
have been unfavorable to the case of the spoliator, [citations 
omitted]. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16). 
Second, Plaintiff couples his interpretation of the law with 
a misstatement of the trial court's position when he asserts that 
the trial court found admissible evidence to support the claim that 
BC (through Mr. Blomquist) admitted a "defective" part was 
discarded. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16). 
A. The Trial Court Granted BC's Motion For Summary Judgement 
Because Even If It Was Assumed That The Brake Assembly Was 
Discarded, There Was No Evidence To Support Plaintiff's Claim 
That A Defect In the Brake Could Cause The Subject Accident. 
The trial court's order of summary judgment stated, in 
pertinent part, that: 
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged during oral argument that he 
could not prove any specific defect of the braking assembly of 
the bicycle without the alleged missing part. Therefore, the 
court finds that the Plaintiff cannot prove a products 
liability, breach of implied warranty, breach of express 
warranty or negligence cause of action against The Bicycle 
Center. 
* * * 
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Plaintiff cannot prove a case of spoliation of evidence under 
the facts of Plaintiff's case without obtaining expert 
testimony stating that the missing part could have, under the 
circumstances, produced the accident described bv Plaintiff if 
the part were defective and unreasonable dangerous or 
negligently installed. 
The Plaintiff did not produce any such expert testimony. 
Therefore, the court holds that Plaintiff has not established 
a factual basis for his claim of spoliation of evidence 
* * * 
The record before the court contains admissible evidence to 
the effect that the brakes on Plaintiff's bicycle 
malfunctioned, and that the malfunction caused the accident. 
The court concludes that this evidence is not material, and, 
therefore, does not create a material issue of fact, (R. 682-
683)(emphasis added). 
The trial court demanded that the Plaintiff introduce 
competent evidence that would show that the part purportedly 
discarded was, in some manner, material to the establishment of the 
Plaintiff's assorted causes of action. However, not only did the 
Plaintiff fail to introduce any expert testimony showing how the 
allegedly discarded part, if defective, could have caused the 
accident, the Plaintiff did not introduce any material evidence in 
support of any cause of action set-forth in his Complaint.4 
B. In Order To Obtain A Favorable Inference Under A Theory Of 
Spoliation. There Must Be Evidence That The Spoliator Had 
Notice Of A Duty To Preserve the Evidence. 
4
 As pointed out previously, this is not simply a case 
where the Plaintiff could not find an expert who could support 
Plaintiff's theory of liability. Conversely, Plaintiff contacted 
and expert and was advised that a defect in the brake assembly was 
not a "probable cause" of the alleged accident. (R. 499-500). 
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The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of his assertion that 
the "general rule"5 is that "the destruction of or spoliation of 
relevant evidence raises an inference that the evidence would have 
been unfavorable to the position of the spoliator"6 do not apply 
to the above-captioned matter. 
In each case cited by Plaintiff, the alleged spoliator had 
notice of the opposing party's claim andf nevertheless, destroyed 
documents and/or evidence essential to the proper adjudication of 
outstanding claims. As a result, the court concluded in each case 
cited by the Plaintiff that the destruction of the evidence was 
"purposeful," "wrongful" and/or "illegal." 
For example, Plaintiff cites the case of National Ass'n of 
Radiation Survivors v. Turnaae, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In 
Turnaae. the plaintiff sought sanctions against the Veteran's 
Administration ("VA") because of the destruction of discoverable 
documents. The VA had been involved in litigation for more than 
three years and knew the destroyed documents were responsive to 
outstanding discovery requests of the plaintiff. Thus, Turnaae is 
distinguishable from the instant matter in three significant 
respects: (1) the destroyed evidence in Turnaae was destroyed long 
after litigation had commenced whereas the evidence allegedly 
5
 Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16. 
6
 Id. 
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discarded in the instant matter was discarded years before 
litigation was threatened or contemplated by the Plaintiff; (2) the 
evidence destroyed in Turnaae was directly responsive to 
outstanding discovery requests whereasf in the instant matterf 
there were not only no outstanding discovery requests when the part 
was allegedly discarded by BC, but, as indicated previously, 
litigation had not been commenced or even contemplated by 
Plaintiff; and (3), because the defendant in Turnaae destroyed 
documents that were responsive to outstanding discovery requests, 
the plaintiff was seeking sanctions against the VA pursuant to 
Rules 11 and 26 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure whereas the 
Appellant in the present matter was attempting to create a genuine 
issue of material fact in hopes of defeating summary judgment. 
Thus, in view of the differences between the instant matter 
and Turnaae, it is no wonder that the Plaintiff omitted from his 
brief the court's explanation as to why it permitted an inference 
that the destroyed evidence would have favored the plaintiff. In 
pertinent part, the court stated: 
[T]he defendant knew of should have known that these destroyed 
materials were relevant and discoverable. After more than 
three years of litigation, the VA can hardly assert that it 
was not on notice of the issues involved in this lawsuit. It 
is no defense to suggest, as the defendant attempts, that 
particular employees were not on notice. To hold otherwise 
would permit an agency, corporate officer, or legal department 
to shield itself from discovery obligations by keeping 
employees ignorant. The obligation to retain discoverable 
materials is an affirmative one; it requires that an agency or 
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corporate officers having notice of discovery obligations 
communicate those obligations to employees in possession of 
discoverable materials. 
Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in relying on Nation-wide Check Corp, Inc. v. 
Forrest Hills Distributors, Inc.. 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982)
 # the 
Plaintiff again failed to note that Nation-wide involved a 
situation where, 10 days after the litigation was commenced, the 
defendants elected to discard all documents in their possession 
which would have facilitated the plaintiff's case.7 In explaining 
the favorable inferences subsequently granted to the plaintiff, the 
court stated: 
The inference depends, of course, on a showing that the party 
had notice that the documents were relevant at the time he 
failed to produce them or destroyed them. The adverse 
inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one 
not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the 
common sense observation that a party who has notice that a 
document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy 
the document is more likely to have been threatened by the 
document than is a party in the same position who does not 
destroy the document. 
* * * 
7
 Specifically, the court in Nation-wide stated "[the 
defendant] knew as early as December 1974, from his communications 
with Nation-wide's attorney, that the business records might be 
needed to trace the money order funds into the hands of the 
assignees." The court concluded that while [the defendant] had not 
acted in actual bad faith, he had "intentionally discarded" the 
documents "in knowing disregard of the plaintiff's claims." Id. at 
217 (emphasis added). 
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The other rationale for the inference has to do with its 
prophylactic and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact 
to draw the inference presumably deters parties from 
destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at 
trial. 
Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
In May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982) , a medical 
malpractice - wrongful death action, the court allowed a favorable 
inference in favor of the plaintiff because "[p]roof may be made 
concerning a party purposefully and wrongfully destroying a 
document which he knew was supportive of the interested opponent." 
Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
Finally, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the 
Plaintiff was able to show that BC intentionally and willfully 
discarded the allegedly defective Brake assembly, BC would, 
nevertheless, be entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff 
has failed to introduce any other evidence which might support the 
causes of action set-forth in his complaint. American 
Jurisprudence states: 
Such a presumption or inference arises, however, only where 
the spoliation or destruction was intentional, and indicated 
fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does not 
arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no 
fraudulent intent. 
* * * 
While the spoliation of evidence may raise a presumption 
or inference against the party guilty of such act, it does not 
relieve the other party from introducing evidence tending 
affirmatively to prove his case, insofar as he has the burden 
of proof. This presumption or inference does not amount to 
substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact 
necessary to the other party's cause. 
Am. Jur. 2d. Evidence §177, 220-21 (citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's spoliation claim fails because 
the evidence is that Mr. Blomquist and BC were only asked to repair 
the Plaintiff's bicycle. (R. 558). There is no evidence in the 
record that: (1) BC intentionally or willfully destroyed evidence; 
(2) anyone asked Mr. Blomquist to retain any parts he may have 
replaced in repairing the Bike; (3) BC was aware that Plaintiff was 
contemplating litigation at the time he requested the repairs; or 
(4) the Plaintiff has any other information to support his claims 
that the defective part which was allegedly discarded proximately 
caused the accident. 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff cannot state a Prima 
Facie case of spoliation of evidence against BC and, as a result, 
this Court should affirm summary judgment in favor of BC. 
POINT VI 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND 
EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO 
RESULT FROM DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RECORDS. 
In reviewing a trial court's conclusion of law, the Court of 
Appeals applies a correction of error standard and gives no 
deference to the trial court. Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677 
(Utah App. 1989), granted 779 P.2d 688, affirmed 788 P.2d 520 
(1990). 
The basis for the Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is 
two-fold: First, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a 
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protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) (7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (R. 375). Rule 26(c)(7) states "[t]hat a trade 
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way. . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). 
Second, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a protective 
order based on a stipulation agreed to by the parties during the 
Plaintiff's deposition. (R. 375) 
However, Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. First, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to a protective order under Rule 26(c) (7) 
because he has not shown "good cause" as required by the Rule 
26(c). Second, in arguing that the parties stipulated that "[a]11 
information received from Dr. Burns and Burns Chiropractic Clinic 
regarding business practices" was to be kept confidential, 
Plaintiff misstates the actual stipulation agreed to by the parties 
during Plaintiff's deposition. 
A. In Order To Obtain A Protective Order Pursuant To Rule 26(c) 
Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, The Moving Party Must 
Show Good Cause. 
Rule 26(c) specifically provides that: 
[U]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,or undue 
burden or expense . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). 
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The critical language in Rule 26(c) is "for good cause shown." 
Despite the requirement that the moving party show good cause, the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order did not provide any 
information explaining why the business records of Burns' 
Chiropractic Clinics should be kept confidential. (R. 378). The 
Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order made no showing of "good 
cause" whatsoever, but merely requested protection pursuant to 
Rule 26(c)(7) without any elaboration whatsoever. (R. 378). 
In Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA. 121 F.R.D. 32 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) , the defendants moved to dismiss a protective order 
and to compel discovery in a products liability action arising out 
an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle. In that case, the 
defendant made a Motion for a Protective Order, pursuant to Rule 
26(c) of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure, ostensibly to limit 
the dissemination of its purported trade secrets and other 
confidential research, development, and commercial information that 
may have been produced during litigation. However, The District 
Court held that "[p]urported trade secrets and other confidential 
commercial information enioy no automatic protection from 
disclosure. Id. at 35 (citing United States v. IBM. 67 F.R.D. 40, 
42, n.l (1975) (emphasis added). The court went further and noted 
that: 
In order to show that certain designated information 
should be protected under Rule 26(c) this court requires 
the party seeking such a protective order to show: (1) 
that the information rises to the level of a trade secret 
[citations omitted], and (2) that there is good cause to 
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protect the information [citations omitted]. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(c). 
To determine whether the information a party seeks to protect 
rises to the level of trade secret this court has adopted the 
following factors set forth in Section 757 of the Restatement 
of Torts: (1) the extent to which the information is known 
outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by 
employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent 
of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the 
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to 
his competitors; and (5) the amount of effort or money 
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or 
difficulty with which the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others. 
Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (1975)). 
In elaborating on the public policies underlying these 
factors, the court said: 
The requirement of good cause is based upon one of the 
fundamental premises of discovery: Discovery is to be 
conducted in the public unless compelling reasons exist for 
denying the public access to the proceedings, (citations 
omitted) . In this court, to show good cause a party must 
demonstrate that disclosure of allegedly confidential 
information will work a clearly defined and very serious 
iniurv to his business. 
Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
In denying the defendant's motion for a protective order, the 
court concluded that the defendant "merely made conclusory 
allegations" in an attorney's affidavit, that disclosure of highly 
sensitive trade secret materials would hurt the defendant's 
competitive position in the ATV market. Id. at 35. 
Consequently, the court held that the defendant did not make 
the requisite showing that the information rose to the level of 
trade secret or that there was good cause shown for the protective 
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order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and therefore denied the 
plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. Id. 
The case at bar presents a situation that is quite similar to 
Turick. Here, the Plaintiff has merely made conclusory assertions 
that the business records for the Burns' Chiropractic Clinics 
contain trade secrets and confidential business practices that 
allegedly require protection. (R. 378). The Plaintiff does not 
show any "good cause" by demonstrating how the disclosure would 
injure his business. (R. 378). The party seeking a protective 
order has the burden of proof of showing good cause for the order. 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 529 F. Supp. 
866, 890 (E.D. Pa.)(1981); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 
F.R.D. 471, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In the case at bar, it is 
apparent that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof. The 
plaintiff "cannot generally rely upon his conclusory statements, 
but must present evidence of specific damage likely to result from 
disclosure," Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines. Inc.. 54 F.R.D. 21, 
22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
In Zenith Radio Corp.. the court noted that: 
[i]t has also been held that the specific instances where 
disclosure will inflict a competitive disadvantage should 
be set forth in more than the briefs or the hearsay 
allegation of counsel's affidavit, for a protective order 
should not issue on that basis alone. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp at 891. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing case law, this Court 
should find that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
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granted Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order without the 
requisite showing of "good cause" and evidence of specific damage 
likely to result from disclosing the business records of Burns' 
Chiropractic Clinics. BC respectfully requests that this court 
reverse the trial court's issuance of a Protective Order in favor 
of the Plaintiff. 
B. The Plaintiff Misstates The Scope Of The Stipulation Between 
The Parties In Asserting That All Business Records Of The 
Plaintiff Were To Be Kept Confidential. 
The issue of confidentiality was first raised during the 
deposition of the Plaintiff on April 19, 1991. After a discussion 
off the record wherein the parties agreed to what matters were to 
be kept confidential, the parties then went back on the record and 
stated their agreement. Specifically, the parties memorialized the 
stipulation as follows: 
Mr. Wells: I think we are getting into a situation where we 
are going to have some protection if we are going to talk 
about this stuff. 
Mr. Hansen: I would agree that what your client tells me, his 
secrets of good management, not be divulged to any other 
person with the exception of the insurance carrier, State 
Farm, expert witnesses whom we may retain and members of my 
office staff and attorneys who are involved in this 
litigation. 
Mr. Wells: Would you agree to seal the deposition except for 
those persons? 
Mr. Hansen: I would agree to seal the deposition. 
Mr. Wells: It will only be used at trial for impeachment 
purposes or whatever other purposes are allowed by the rules 
and that it will not be shown to or the testimony divulged to 
anyone other than the people that you have mentioned and your 
carrier of course. 
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Mr. Ferguson: I will stipulate to that, to this portion of the 
deposition being sealed. 
Mr. Hansen. So Will I. 
[An off the record discussion was held] 
Mr. Hansen: Let's go back on the record then and let me 
restate what I understand the agreement is. With respect to 
the deposition from this point forward, it is agreed by all 
counsel and the deponent that the deposition from this point 
forward will be sealed with the exception of the employees of 
State Farm, employees of Aetna Insurance, employees of the law 
firm of Morgan & Hansen, employees of the law firm of — 
Mr. Ferguson: Williams & Hunt. 
Mr. Hansen: and also expert witnesses excluding from the 
definition of expert witnesses another chiropractor. It's 
also agreed that before this portion of the deposition is 
presented to an expert witness chiropractor, that we will 
obtain a court order from the court allowing us to present 
this information to a chiropractor, unless of course, you 
would stipulate to that, but that's up to you. Is that 
agreed? 
Mr. Wells: And with the caveat that the people who by 
definition are allowed to see this will — 
Mr. Hansen: We will take the responsibility to advise them. 
Mr. Wells: — will also be bound not to disclose the contents 
to any person to whom it is not allowed to be shown by the 
terms of the stipulation. 
Mr. Hansen: Correct. 
Mr. Ferguson: Agreed. 
(R. 384-385 & 420-422) (emphasis added). 
As set forth above, the terms of the oral stipulation entered 
into by counsel on the record during Plaintiff's deposition on 
April 19, 1991, pertained only to the sealed portion of the 
deposition and did not encompass all business and or financial 
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records which may and, in fact, were produced in response to 
subsequent discovery. Nevertheless, in moving for a protective 
order, some six months later, on October 29, 1991, Plaintiff 
represented to the court that the parties had entered into a 
stipulation pursuant to which the parties agreed to keep "[ajJJL 
information received from Dr. Burns or Burns Chiropractic Clinic 
regarding business practices would be used only in conjunction with 
the litigation11 and would otherwise be kept confidential. 
Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel testified, by way of affidavit 
dated December 5, 1991, that: 
At the deposition of Brian Burns held April 19, 1991, counsel 
for defendant agreed, in on the record and off the record 
discussions, that if Dr. Burns would agree to divulge 
information on his business practices the information would be 
treated as confidential. 
Counsel agreed that with respect to business information 
provided, counsel would treat the information as follows: 
a) All information received from Dr. Burns or Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic regarding business practices would be used 
only in conjunction with the litigation. 
b) Such information would only be revealed or shown to 
attorneys, paralegal and expert witnesses working the case and 
would not be revealed to clients. 
c) The attorneys, paralegal and expert witnesses to whom 
information is given shall be bound by the terms of the 
stipulation and any order of the court entered pursuant to 
this stipulation. 
When litigation is complete all records produced or 
information received is to be returned to plaintiff and/or 
destroyed. 
(R.435-436; See also R. 378-379). 
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In comparing the discussion of each parties attorney during 
the deposition of Plaintiff and the affidavit subsequently filed by 
Plaintiff's counsel in support of Plaintiff's motion for a 
protective order, it is clear that Plaintiff misstates the 
agreement of the parties. Accordingly, because the parties only 
agreed to seal a portion of the deposition, and not all documents 
produced in the normal course of discovery, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to a protective order because of the stipulation set-forth 
in Plaintiff's deposition. 
POINT VII 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM FOR CONFIDENTIALITY 
IN THE DOCUMENTS BY PRODUCING THEM IN ADVANCE OF 
A PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) contemplates that a 
protective order will be issued before the materials sought to be 
protected are produced. Specifically, Rule 26(C)(7) states "that 
a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed . . . " Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(c)(7). 
In the case at bar, the discovery took place in August and 
September of 1991. (R. 398). The Motion for Protective Order was 
not filed until October 29, 1991, long after the Plaintiffs 
business records had been produced. (R. 397). 
In Gold Standard v. American Resources. 805 P.2d 164 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant (Getty) 
waived its work product protection by inadvertently disclosing 
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information to the plaintiff. The Court noted that by voluntarily 
producing memoranda in response to plaintiff's demand for 
production of documents, the defendant waived his right to the 
protection afforded work products. Id. at 171. In that case, 
which is analogous to the case at bar, the defendant waited to file 
its Motion for Protective Order until after the documents were 
already produced to the plaintiff. The court stated that lf[t]he 
inaction and delay in filing constitute an independent waiver of 
whatever right Getty may have been able to assert, and the trial 
judge should have so found." Id. at 172. 
Although Gold Standard involved work product protection, the 
analogy can be made that by failing to demonstrate diligence in 
procuring a protective order for confidential information, 
disclosing such information prior to securing a protective order, 
is in fact a waiver of that privilege. And in the case at bar, 
that is exactly what the plaintiff did by not procuring a 
protective order prior to disclosing the business records of Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT AND COUNSEL, AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT, 
HAVE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES, 
INFORMATION FOUND IN DOCUMENTS PRODUCED, WHICH PROVIDES A PRIMA 
FACIE CASE OF THE VIOLATION 
OF THE LAW8 OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH, 
In the Plaintiff's deposition taken on April 19, 1991, the 
Plaintiff was asked by defense counsel the following questions 
and gave the following responses: 
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Q: Do you have any type of partnership arrangement with 
Dr. Morrow? 
A: No. 
Q: Any fee sharing arrangements? 
A: No. We were originally going tof but it didn't pan out. 
(R. 414). 
The documents which the plaintiff seeks to keep 
confidential illustrate that Burns Chiropractic Clinics, Inc., 
paid tof or received from Dr. Morrow the following amounts in the 
following years: 
1988: $52,383.91 [Burns to Morrow] 
1989: $43,170.00 [Morrow to Burns] 
$ 1,309.70 [Burns to Morrow] 
1990: $38,302.68 [Morrow to Burns] 
The documents show that a portion of this money was paid 
pursuant to a fee-sharing agreement. The fee-sharing agreement 
was that Dr. Burns paid Dr. Morrow 20% of the fee he received 
from the patients who were referred by Dr. Morrow to Dr. Burns. 
(R.400). 
This type of fee-sharing arrangement is in violation of 
State statute, which the Department of Professional Licensing 
will investigate and, if determined to be accurate, will 
prosecute. The penalty that may be issued by the Board of 
Professional Licensing includes suspension, revocation, or 
refusal to renew any license. 
42 
The statute that applies to a chiropractor is 58-12-53(15) 
(1990), which provides as follows: "Unprofessional conduct" in 
relation to the practice of chiropractic, includes: 
(15) Any conduct or practicef contrary to the 
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic 
profession, or any conduct or practice which does or 
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety or the patient or public, or any conduct, 
practice or condition which does or might impair the 
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully. 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-52 (1990), provides as follows 
in pertinent part: 
(1) The director of the division, upon the written 
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or 
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in 
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in 
the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral 
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct; 
With respect to Dr. Morrow, who is an orthopedic surgeon, 
the following statutes apply: 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-35(1) (1990). 
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of 
the board, shall deny an application for a license to 
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician 
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State 
in the following cases: 
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral 
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct 
as defined in this Act; 
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-36(9) (1990) provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of 
medicine includes: 
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(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine 
by one not licensed or by one whose license is 
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agentf or 
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who 
does not hold a license to practice medicine within 
this State; 
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a letter from the Department of 
Professional Licensing stating that a fee-sharing agreement 
between a physician and chiropractor is a violation of Utah law, 
which the Department of Professional Licensing will investigate, 
and where appropriate, prosecute. The documents which Plaintiff 
attempts to keep confidential provide the basis for the 
Department of Professional Licensing to investigate and prosecute 
both Dr. Burns and Dr. Morrow. 
"Lawyers, including judges, have a duty to report 
unprofessional conduct to the appropriate authorities." See 
Blacknell v. State, 502 N.E. 2d 899. The Code of Judicial 
Administration states in pertinent part: 
Cannon 3 - A judge should perform duties of the office 
impartially and diligently. 
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain 
professional competence in it. 
The Court and counsel for the defendants have a duty, as 
officers of the court, to disclose to the appropriate 
authorities, information found in documents produced which states 
a prima facie case of unlawful activity. As officers of the 
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court, the trial judge and respective counsel must be faithful 
and uphold the laws of the State of Utah. 
Because these same documents call into question the 
truthfulness of Dr. Burns' statement in his deposition that there 
was no fee sharing arrangement between he and Dr. Morrow, these 
documents should also be forwarded to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office for their review on the issue of whether or not 
Dr. Burns should be prosecuted for perjury. 
CONCLUSION 
BC respectfully submits that the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment in its favor should be affirmed. BC also 
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's protective 
order. 
Respectfully submitted this 30 day of March, 1993. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Darwin Hansen 
Randall D. Lund 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Cross-Appellant The Bicycle Center 
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